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I. A YEAR WE WON’T SOON FORGET
In a year dominated by a global pandemic, large-scale quarantines and dramatic economic shocks, and 
a contentious and polarizing Presidential election, many look towards 2021 with great optimism. Sure, a 
Presidential veto of the National Defense Authorization Act is an unusual event, but a prompt, New Year’s 
Day (2021) Congressional override (the first of the Administration, delivered in its last month; 81-13 in 
the Senate; 322-87 in the House) rendered the action no more than an historical footnote. See, Unclear 
Whether President Will Follow Through On FY 2021 NDAA Veto Threat, 62 GC ¶ 355. 
In the sphere of government contracting, our crystal ball remains cloudy, but we are confident that 
the one constant will be change.
A. The Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 Pandemic and Remote Work: Before 2020, few of us antici-
pated that a global pandemic would redefine our fundamental relationships with our physical workspace, 
the nature of office work, commuting, and, of course, business travel. Fortunately, we lack direct personal 
experience to compare 2020 to the 1918 Flu Epidemic, but it is difficult to deny the extraordinary disrup-
tion and devastation – personal, national, and global – human and economic – wrought by the virus. By 
2020’s end, more than 20 million coronavirus cases – and more than 350,000 coronavirus-related deaths 
– had been reported in the United States.
Obviously, the pandemic disrupted “business as usual.” OMB and DoD responded in a series of memos. 
See, generally, Margaret M. Weichert, OMB Memo M-20-18, Managing Federal Contract Performance Is-
sues with the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), (March 20, 2020) https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/docs/
covid-19/M-20-18.pdf: 
[M]any Federal government contractors that ordinarily work side-by-side with the Federal 
workforce may currently be unable to access their Federal work sites as a result of building closures, 
quarantines or implementation of social distancing practices. Agencies are urged to work with their 
contractors, if they haven’t already, to evaluate and maximize telework for contractor employees, 
wherever possible. Telework is an important tool for enabling continued contract performance in a 
manner that can meet health and safety guidelines ….
The Weichert memorandum also encourages the use of existing “special emergency procurement 
authorities … designed to reduce friction for contractors, especially small businesses, and the govern-
ment and enable more rapid response to the many pressing demands agencies face.” The memorandum 
also includes frequently asked questions (FAQ’s) addressing, among other things:
• Telework;
• Contract schedules and excusable delays;
• Changes (or modifications) and equitable adjustments for costs associated with safety measures;
• Work stoppages on construction (repair) work of existing federal buildings;
• Alternatives to in-person activities (from meetings to conferences);
Reprinted from Thomson ReuTeRs GoveRnmenT ConTRaCTs YeaR In RevIew CoveRInG 2020 ConfeRenCe BRIefs, 
with permission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2021. Further use without the permission of the pub-
lisher is prohibited. For further information about this publication, call 1-800-328-9352 or visit http://
legal.thomsonreuters.com.
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• Communication and engagement between the government cus-
tomer and contracting partners;
• Special emergency procurement flexibilities; 
• Leveraging category management;
• Lack of justification for local firm preferences under the Stafford 
Act; and
• Data collection related to use of emergency procurement authorities.
We applaud the March 30, 2020 Memorandum from Kim Herrington 
(DoD DPC), Managing Defense Contracts Impacts of the Novel Coronavirus, 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/Managing_Contracts_un-
der_COVID-19_Memo_DPC.pdf, which, although it largely ignored contracts 
for services, among other things:
• Acknowledged that the pandemic would “affect the cost, schedule, 
and performance of many DoD Contracts”;
• Highlighted remedy-granting contract clauses that excuse 
performance delays and entitled contractors to equitable ad-
justments (of schedule, contract price, or both); and
• Discussed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act, specifically Section 3610, authority and agency 
discretion “to modify the terms and conditions of [contracts] to 
reimburse paid leave where the contractor employees could 
not access work sites or telework but actions were needed to keep 
such employees in a ready state.” See, generally, Congress Averts 
Shutdown, Extends CARES Act Paid-Leave Reimbursements, 62 
GC ¶ 282; Scott A. Schipma, Michael J. Schaengold & Daniel D. 
Straus, Feature Comment: CARES Act: Changes To Government 
Contracting Authority, 62 GC ¶ 92 (explaining, among other things, 
that “[o]pportunities for both ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ 
Government contractors are available.”)
Not every contractor could work remotely, but important work needed 
to continue even under disruptions. Federal guidance was needed here also. 
See USD(A&S) Ellen Lord’s Memorandum, Defense Industrial Base Essen-
tial Critical Infrastructure Workforce (March 20, 2020) (those “work[ing] in a 
critical infrastructure industry … have a special responsibility to maintain 
[their] normal work schedule.”), which drew its authority from and expanded 
on the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), Christopher C. Krebs, 
Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers 
During COVID-19 Response (March 19, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/
Mar/22/2002268024/-1/-1/1/DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-ESSENTIAL-
CRITICAL-INFRASTRUCTURE-WORKFORCE-MEMO.PDF. These two 
memos allowed contractor personnel to continue work despite state and local 
orders that otherwise would have stopped work. See, e.g., Franklin Turner, 
Alexander Major & Cara Wulf, Just What The Doctor Ordered—Remedies 
For Federal Contractors During The COVID-19 Pandemic And Beyond, 62 
GC ¶ 116; Kara Daniels, Craig Holman, Kristen Ittig & Tom Pettit, Feature 
Comment: Prepare, Communicate, Document And Segregate—A Government 
Contractor’s Guide To Addressing Performance Disruptions And Delays Related 
To COVID-19, 62 GC ¶ 74.
DoD also issued a memo indefinitely increasing the progress payment 
rate (from 80 to 90 percent for large business concerns; from 90 to 95 per-
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
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cent for small business concerns) pursuant to DFARS 232.501-1, 252.232-
7004, FAR 52.232-16, and 52.232-16, Alternates II and III. Class Deviation 
– Progress Payment Rates, DARS Tracking Number: 2020-O0010 (March 20, 
2020), https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/press-media/deviation-for-change-
in-progress-payments.ashx; Implementation of Class Deviation 2020-O0010 
– Progress Payment Rates, (April 3, 2020) (“Contractors must wait until their 
contracts are modified or contact the Administrative Contracting Officer before 
submitting requests for payments at the higher rate.”), https://www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA00744-20-DPC.pdf. 
Despite the scope of the OMB and DoD memos, business-as-usual was 
also disrupted for pandemic-specific contracts. From an historical perspective, 
one of the most remarkable documents from this period is the whistle-blower 
complaint of Dr. Rick Bright, formerly a Program Lead within Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA) Influenza Division International Pro-
gram, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6882560/Rick-Bright-
Whistleblower-Complaint.pdf. The allegations are chock full of government 
contracts (in addition to fiscal law) issues, including discussion of requests 
for proposals (RFP’s), broad agency announcements (BAA’s), contracting of-
ficers and their representatives (CO’s and COR’s), technical evaluation panels 
(TEP’s), independent government cost estimates (IGCE’s), source selection 
officials (SSA’s), task orders, failed contracts, option exercises, bid protests, 
procurement integrity violations, funding and appropriations, and, of course, 
overwhelmed contracting staff. It’s a remarkable document.
B. A New Administration. As these materials go to press, we anticipate 
a change of administration, on January 20, 2021, prior to the annual confer-
ence. We are optimistic that, by the time of the conference, the numerous (to 
this point, almost uniformly unsubstantiated and unsuccessful) legal actions 
and legislative efforts intended to derail the orderly transfer of power following 
an election will have run their course. Moreover, despite its delayed launch, 
inevitable controversies (for example, a military waiver requirement for the 
Secretary of Defense nominee; see, e.g., Dan Maurer, The Military Waiver 
Requirement for Secretary of Defense Shouldn’t Substitute Individuation, 
LawfaRe (December 22, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/military-waiver-
requirement-secretary-defense-shouldnt-substitute-individuation), we expect 
this transition to follow a more conventional path than the 2017 transition. 
See, generally, mIChaeL LewIs, The fIfTh RIsk (2018) (a unique non-fiction 
account of a Presidential Transition and the initial political appointment 
process; in many ways, an ode to the critical importance of expertise in federal 
government service). Of course, the outcome of the yet-to-be-decided January 
2021 Georgia Senate runoff elections, and, with it, the Senate majority, has 
the potential to dramatically impact this process.
1) Vacancies and Priorities. It is (currently) premature for us to 
speculate as to who will assume significant leadership roles in the acquisi-
tion community under the new administration. Painting with a broad brush, 
we expect few major surprises, instead seeing recognizable, in many cases, 
familiar, faces bringing significant, relevant experience to the table. At this 
early date, concerns remain: our profession values industry experience, which, 
to some, appears under-represented in the transition.
In terms of priorities, we recall that both the (first) Obama and the Trump 
administrations were slow to nominate administrators for the Office of Federal 
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Procurement Policy (OFPP), and we hope that the incoming administration 
bucks that trend. And, of course, time will tell what becomes of initiatives 
and cross-agency priorities (CAP’s) under the President’s Management 
Agenda (PMA), such as frictionless acquisition and Workforce 2025. (On the 
PMA and CAP’s, our strong bias favors making data and priorities public 
and accessible. See, e.g., https://www.performance.gov/about/CAP_about.
html.) See, e.g., Sometimes Doors Open: Sometimes You Have to Open Them 
Yourself—A Conversations with OFPP Administrator Dr. Michael Wooten, 61 
ConT. mGmT. 12 (January 2021). The lion’s share of the Section 809 Panel’s 
ninety-eight recommendations from 2019 remain available as potential fod-
der for reform. Section 809 Panel, https://section809panel.org/. Moreover, 
there are innumerable suggestions for how the new administration might 
approach various aspects of acquisition differently. For example, in the lim-
ited context of defense supply contracting, Richard Dunn, Feature Comment: 
New Administration: New Acquisition System?, 62 GC ¶ 344, argues for “an 
alternative to the traditional DOD acquisition system … based on Other 
Transactions [OT’s], Procurement for Experimental Purposes, 10 USCA §§ 
2371, 2371b and 2373, and other flexible business practices.” Dunn’s proposed 
action items would include:
• Empowering personnel with education and training;
• Implementing congressional mandates by creating a preference 
for the use of OT’s and other forms of innovative practices;
• Establishing a policy making a dual-use approach preferred for 
science and technology projects – for these, FAR-based contracting 
would be a last resort;
• Stimulating use of middle-tier acquisition with prototype OT’s;
• Identifying defense industry segments that can embrace com-
mercial practices; and
• Ensuring that OT action teams are not only empowered, but also 
insulated and protected from layers of “just say no” bureaucracy.
2) Infrastructure. In nominating Pete Buttigieg to serve as Secretary 
of Transportation, President-Elect Biden highlighted “ambitious plans” with 
regard to infrastructure. Buttigieg himself focused on “roads and bridges, 
... railways and transit systems,” which, at the federal level, would more 
likely depend upon grant, rather than procurement, spending. (We haven’t 
discussed infrastructure in these materials since 2019, when we bemoaned 
that, while the bridge disaster in Genoa, Italy, briefly brought the issue back 
into the public’s consciousness, it had no staying power). There is potential 
for broad, bipartisan support for public construction projects even within a 
divided, polarized government. Federal contracts will come into play if the 
framework of infrastructure expands to include the work needed for cyber-
security, both within government and into the private sector. At press time, 
the consequences of espionage are still being assessed, but corrective actions 
would also create additional potential for bipartisan support. Modernizing 
legacy systems is the fastest path to greater security, and federal agencies 
already modernized some legacy systems under COVID-19, demonstrating 
a clear potential to do more.
3) Sustainable Procurement: On a related note, the incoming admin-
istration plans to reverse course and affirmatively attempt to slow climate 
change. Here, infrastructure investment will play a key role. See, e.g., Brad 
Plumer, To Cut Emissions to Zero, U.S. Needs to Make Big Changes in Next 
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
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10 Years, n.Y. TImes (December 15, 2020) (“If the United States wants to get 
serious about tackling climate change, the country will need to build a stag-
gering amount of new energy infrastructure in just the next 10 years, laying 
down steel and concrete at a pace barely being contemplated today.”), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/climate/america-next-decade-climate.html. Last 
year’s materials suggested that, as a community, we’ll need to increase our 
focus on sustainable procurement, discussing, among other things, sustainable 
development goals (SDG’s) and green public procurement. For more on this 
increasingly critical topic, see Steven L. Schooner & Markus Speidel, Warm-
ing Up to Sustainable Procurement, 60 ConT. mGmT. 32 (October 2020) (chock 
full of useful reference material), available at https://www.ncmahq.org/news/
magazine-details/warming-up-to-sustainable-procurement. 
See also, more generally, Michael T. Klare’s 2019 book, aLL heLL BReakInG 
Loose: The PenTaGon’s PeRsPeCTIve on CLImaTe ChanGe. Klare identifies a wide 
range of global warming–related risks—from water, food, or energy scarcity 
to massive drought-, flood-, or fire-induced refugee migrations to “a whole 
new ocean” opened by melting of the polar ice caps, creating a new theater of 
military operations. He also warns of the worst-case scenario, in which the 
military may confront multiple emergencies – humanitarian disaster relief, 
support for beleaguered foreign states, and disruptions to the global supply 
and food chains, while military bases are out of commission due to flooding or 
fires or drought and troops are engaged in domestic relief operations, which 
leaves them ill-equipped to address conventional military threats. 
See, also, DOD Falls Short In Considering Climate Risks To Contractors, 
GAO Reports, 62 GC ¶ 216; GAO-20-511, Climate Resilience: Actions Needed 
to Ensure DOD Considers Climate Risks to Contractors as Part of Acquisition, 
Supply, and Risk (June 2020) www.gao.gov/assets/710/707817.pdf, referenc-
ing, inter alia, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Impacts, Risks, and 
Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume 
II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, 
T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart, eds.)], (Washington, D.C. 2018): 
[C]limate change is projected to have broad effects on multiple 
sectors that can affect contractor support and DOD supply chains, 
including disruptions to energy, water, and transportation systems....
(DOD) has not routinely assessed climate-related risks faced by its 
contractors as part of its acquisition and supply processes, through 
which DOD obtains contracted goods and services.... [G]uidance 
did not implement DOD’s climate change directive by including 
consideration of climate change or extreme weather. Until DOD 
and the military departments include these considerations in 
their guidance on acquisition and supply chain processes, they risk 
continuing to develop acquisition strategies and managing supply 
chains without building climate resilience into these processes and 
potentially jeopardizing their missions. 
II. CRACKING THE $600B THRESHOLD? PROCUREMENT & 
SPEND DATA
A. Peak, Blip, Plateau, Trend? Federal procurement spending exceeded 
$600 billion for FY2020. Let that sink in for just a moment. Unlike much of 
the past decade, the procurement dollars seem to be flowing relatively freely 
(despite prodigious deficit spending), and procurement spending appears, 
once again, to be on the rise. 
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Federal Procurement and Grant SPendinG FY2001-2020* 







Procurement & Grant  
Spending (Combined)
2020 $618.5 $960.7 $1,579.2
2019 $590.0 $764.6 $1,354.6
2018 $555.5 $756.3 $1,311.8
2017 $510.6 $719.2 $1,229.8
2016 $475.5 $671.2 $1,146.6
2015 $439.8 $619.7 $1,059.5
2014 $446.2 $601.2 $1,047.4
2013 $463.4 $525.0 $988.4
2012 $520.8 $542.1 $1,063.0
2011 $539.8 $570.2 $1,110.0
2010 $561.0 $624.4 $1,185.4
2009 $540.6 $671.6 $1,212.2
2008 $541.6 $391.4 $933.1
2007 $469.3 $430.2 $899.5
2006 $430.5 $490.0 $920.5
2005 $391.2 $441.7 $832.9
2004 $346.1 $450.1 $796.2
2003 $318.0 $493.7 $811.7
2002 $264.1 $406.3 $670.4
2001 $223.0 $330.8 $553.8
* FY 2020 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting. Also, the amounts 
reported above, for every year, 2008-2019, were revised – in some years, significantly 
(e.g., approaching 10 percent) – when compared to prior published USASpending data. 
Updated data is courtesy of The Pulse, summarized in A Decade in Federal Discretionary 
Spending (December 23, 2020), https://thepulsegovcon.com/article/a-decade-in-federal-
discretionary-spending/. 
B. No, It’s Not Just Inflation. To put the scale of the growth in context, 
consider that (according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation 
Calculator, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm):
• $223 billion in 2001 would equate to $331 billion in buying power 
in 2020;
• Recall that, from 2001 through 2008, federal procurement spending 
dramatically outpaced inflation; indeed, $223 billion in 2001 would 
equate to only $271 billion in buying power in 2008, but federal 
procurement spending jumped from $223 billion to $541 billion.
• $463 billion in 2013 would equate to only $523 billion in buying power 
in 2020; yet federal procurement spending jumped to $618 billion.
• $510 billion in 2017 would equate to only $546 billion in buying 
power in 2020, yet (again,) federal procurement spending jumped 
to $618 billion.
• Conversely, federal procurement spending lagged inflation from 
2012 through 2016; $520 billion in 2010 would equate to $533 
billion in buying power in 2016, yet federal procurement spending 
dropped to $475 billion.
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
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C. Defense Dominates: It’s no surprise that the Department of Defense 
accounts for the greatest percentage of the procurement dollars. It’s also in-
teresting to see the extent to which the various agencies’ procurement spend 
vary or remain stable over time.
Agency or Department 2020 Procure-ment in Billions 
2016 Procure-
ment in Billions
Department of Defense $379.7 $298.6
Health & Human Services $40.7 $24.0
Department of Energy $36.0 $28.3
Veterans Affairs $33 $22.6
Department of Homeland Security $19.5 $13.5
National Aeronautics and Space Administration $18.8 $17.3
General Services Administration $17.4 $10.5
Department of State $10.5 $8.7
Department of Agriculture $10.0 $5.8
Department of Justice $8.3 $7.6
Department of Transportation $7.8 $7.6
Department of the Treasury $6.6 $6.2
Agency for International Development $6.1B $4.6
Department of Commerce $5.8B $3.2
D. Grants Continue To Exceed Procurement Dollars: Grants 
again dramatically exceeded procurement spending, as they’ve done for 
seventeen of the last nineteen years. (Procurement dollars last exceeded 
grant spending in 2008.) Having said that, 2020 is unusual is the degree 
of the difference, with grants exceeding procurement dollars by more than 
fi fty-fi ve percent. 
E. What Next? Currently, there is no agreement on spending levels 
for FY22. The budget caps, about which we have talked for a decade, have 
ended. That means there is no ceiling for either defense or civilian agency 
appropriations, but it also means there is no fl oor. Will concerns re-emerge 
about annual defi cits and the federal debt? What level of spending will the 
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new administration propose? What will Congress appropriate, and when? At 
the moment, none of this is clear. 
F. A Lot of Government Spending: What’s particularly striking is the 
cumulative growth in procurement and grant dollars combined: from “only” 
$553 billion in FY 2001 to nearly triple that amount, $1.58 trillion, in FY 
2020. While that level of government spending may appear unsustainable, 
we do not expect a dramatic decrease in that burn rate in 2021, as further 
economic stimulus may be required, and, among other things, there is pent 
up demand for infrastructure, investment in alternative energy solutions, etc.
G. Additional Insights? Over the years, we’ve found it increasingly dif-
fi cult – and, recently, nearly impossible – to obtain credible, macro-level data 
of the type discussed here. Although we were initially optimistic about the 
evolution of the Federal Data Procurement System (FPDS) and pleased with 
the early years of USASpending.gov, the current state of affairs is a largely 
impenetrable data system which requires professional assistance. It does 
not appear that the system redesign incorporated the concerns for outside 
users, including us. As noted above, this year we turned to The Pulse, whose 
team generated a user-friendly summary, chock full of informative insights. 
See, The Pulse, A Decade in Federal Discretionary Spending (December 23, 
2020), https://thepulsegovcon.com/article/a-decade-in-federal-discretionary-
spending/.  In addition to the issues addressed above, the data suggests that:
• Services contracting continues to grow, accounting for 50-58 per-
cent of procurement dollars, but it is diffi cult to generalize given 
the opaque reporting of research and development (R&D) procure-
ment;
• Over the last three fi scal years, discretionary appropriations in-
creased by thirty percent, and that’s excluding the additional $1.76 
trillion spent in FY20 for COVID-19 requirements. Meanwhile, 
Defense spending grew more than 17 percent, while non-defense 
grew more than 15 percent;
© 2021 Thomson Reuters
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• Last year we highlighted that reliance on other transactions (OT’s) 
appears to be increasing. While OT’s are becoming more common 
(and popular), that attention does not always equate to raw dollars. 
The volume of OT activity is increasingly (rapidly), but OT spending 
is still not statistically significant in the landscape of total federal 
discretionary spending (accounting for two percent of total Federal 
contract obligations in FY19, and three percent in FY20). 
• The dollar-based participation rates of small versus large busi-
nesses have been relatively stable, but, of course, large businesses 
have earned many more dollars as the procurement volume has 
increased. For FY20, however, it appeared that small businesses 
saw no growth, while large businesses enjoyed a seven percent 
increase; and 
• The competition data tells a complex story: “[O]ver the last six 
(6) years, non-competitive sole-source award values have almost 
doubled, but as sole sources have increased, so have competing 
contracts. Each component has increased in line with overall 
Government spending, and the breakdown of dollars won through 
competed vs non-competed bids has remained relatively consistent.”
H. More Data-Driven Decision Making? Might 2021 see greater govern-
ment reliance on data-driven decision-making? As of June 2020, the Chief Data 
Officer (CDO) Council has a charter, and the CDO’s are moving in the direction 
of identifying government-wide best practices for the use, dissemination, and 
generation of data. We expect this to be a slow process. GAO noted that “Officials 
from academia, state and local governments, and industry told us that effectively 
implementing data governance requires a culture change that results in a shared 
understanding of the importance of using data as a strategic asset.” See The 
Foundations for Evidence- Based Policymaking Act of 2018 (Evidence Act), Pub. 
L. No. 115-435, 132 Stat. 5529 (2019), Title II, The Open, Public, Electronic and 
Necessary Government Data Act of 2018 (OPEN Government Data Act); GAO-
20-540, DATA Act: OIGs Reported That Quality of Agency-Submitted Data Var-
ied, and Most Recommended Improvements (July 9, 2020), https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-20-540; GAO-21-152, Data Governance: Agencies Made Progress 
in Establishing Governance, but Need to Address Key Milestones (December 16, 
2020) (to be clear, procurement data features only tangentially in this report), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-21-152. 
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We miss DoD’s data rich annual reports on the Performance of the Defense 
Acquisition System, published from 2013 through 2016, and we are hopeful 
that they will return, in some form, with the incoming administration. DoD 
has continue to publish partial updates, and the most recent updates ad-
dress Nunn-McCurdy breaches, program cost performance (in the context 
of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)), MDAP Program 
Cost Performance (or, more accurately, cost growth); and program schedule 
growth of cycle time (or delay, measured by program start to initial operating 
capability (IOC)). Christopher Hastings, Katherine Houston & Brian Joseph, 
Updates to Selected Analyses from the Performance of the Defense Acquisition 
System Series, 2019 SARs Update (September 15, 2020), https://www.acq.
osd.mil/aap/assets/docs/PDAS%202019%20Excerpts_Final%20-cleared.pdf. 
USD(A&S) Ellen Lord announced the development of a “Data and Analyt-
ics Strategy which will make data available to the Acquisition community to: 
(1) assess the progress of our policy transformation; (2) promote transparent 
monitoring of the Defense Acquisition System…; and (3) inform program 
and portfolio decisions.” To our knowledge, the results of this initiative are 
not yet publicly available, in contrast to the reports cited in the previous 
paragraph. See DoD(A&S) Memorandum: Data Transparency to Enable Ac-
quisition Pathways (June 15, 2020), https://www.acq.osd.mil/aap/assets/docs/
USA000854-20%20Signed%20Memo.pdf. 
I. Parting the Curtains on Contractor Ownership. Last year, we 
reported that opaque ownership, or the use of shell companies, which obscures 
contractor ownership, appeared to have finally caught GAO and DoD’s atten-
tion and worked its way into the compliance narrative. See, generally, GAO-
20-106, Defense Procurement: Ongoing DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts 
Should Include Contractor Ownership (November 2019, public version of the 
more sensitive report to DoD), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-106; DoD 
Needs to Assess Contractor Ownership Fraud, 61 GC ¶ 355. Congress took 
action with Section 885 of this year’s NDAA, Disclosure of beneficial owners 
in database for Federal agency contract and grant officers. Corporate Trans-
parency Act, H.R. 2513, 116th Cong. (2019), amending, inter alia, 41 U.S.C § 
2313(d), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2513/text. 
III. NEW PARADIGM? THE PSC BIENNIAL ACQUISITION  
POLICY SURVEY.
Five key themes emerged from the Professional Services Council’s 2020 
Biennial Acquisition Policy Survey (December 10, 2020), www.pscouncil.org/
APS2020, which has long attempted to chronicle the most pressing trends 
and policies in government contracting, based on interviews with acquisition 
leaders from across the federal government.
• The COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed a new paradigm for business 
operations, and effective use of information technology (IT) proved critical, 
while investment in IT infrastructure paid healthy dividends. For many, the 
transition to telework resulted in minimal interruptions to business operations. 
Conversely, the efficiencies of telework were often accompanied by a new and 
different type of fatigue, driven by, among other things, greater availability 
across time bands (including lunch hours) with no breaks for travel and com-
muting. Unique emphasis was focused on the intelligence community, which 
may need to rethink how it operates classified environments including support 
of remote secure environments (including “electronic reading rooms,” etc.).
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• Workforce: With an increasingly grey workforce (and pent up retire-
ment demand), government must become more strategic in hiring, training, 
and retaining new procurement talent. As the acquisition marketplace be-
comes more flexible, conventional FAR-based training appears to stifle inno-
vation; more skill-based training appears necessary, as learning procedures 
doesn’t properly prepare incoming professional for a shifting acquisition 
paradigm. Professionals need to think critically about needs and leverage 
available resources, people, technology and knowledge to “avoid reinventing 
the wheel.” And it’s frustrating to hear, in 2020, after years of progress, that 
respondents still complain that they lack budget to hire and train contract-
ing personnel. Moreover, demand for procurement professionals – both from 
“competing” agencies and the private sector – makes the existing recruiting 
and retention framework unsustainable for growth. In such an environment, 
it’s difficult to simultaneously transition existing professionals into a new 
world without overwhelming them and hire innovative individuals into the 
right positions where existing limitations don’t hold them back.
More broadly, acquisition workforce issues remain a systemic concern. 
NASA Needs To Monitor Acquisition Workforce Performance, COR Certifications, 
62 GC ¶ 308; IG-21-002, NASA’s Management of Its Acquisition Workforce, oig.
nasa.gov/docs/IG-21-002.pdf; DHS Faces Challenges With Acquisition Man-
agement, FEMA Contracting, IT Operations, 62 GC ¶ 334; OIG-21-07, Major 
Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 
Security, www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-07-Nov20.
pdf; NASA’s Challenges Include Contract Oversight, Project Management, 62 GC 
¶ 336; 2020 Report on NASA’s Top Management and Performance Challenges, 
oig.nasa.gov/docs/MC-2020.pdf; NASA Needs To Monitor Acquisition Workforce 
Performance, COR Certifications, 62 GC ¶ 308; IG-21-002, NASA’s Management 
of Its Acquisition Workforce, oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-21-002.pdf; Mike Schaengold, 
Melissa Prusock & Danielle Muenzfeld, Feature Comment: The FY 2020 Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act’s Substantial Impact On Federal Procurement 
Law—Part II, 62 GC ¶ 14 (discussing NDAA Section 861, Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Certification, Education and Career Fields).
• Budget: More continuing resolutions are expected, and, apparently, the 
contracting community is prepared. The survey highlighted a surprising discon-
nect between pessimism and acceptance. On the one hand, most respondents 
perceived that budget challenges had become worse over the last two years: 
forty percent expect budget challenges to continue to intensify, and only twenty 
percent expect them to improve. Yet respondents consistently indicated that 
they’ve grown accustomed to this state of affairs: there’s never enough funding, 
operating under continuing resolutions is a challenge, but, for better or worse, 
procurement officials have become used to operating with volatile budgets.
• Data: A Tale of Two Cities: There’s not much debate that data 
management strategies are critical considerations in acquisition policymak-
ing, and the need for effective data management is here to stay. The survey 
predicts significant increase in agency budget requests for IT to facilitate 
data management. Unfortunately, the survey reinforces that data reporting 
represents a significant compliance burden for industry, and it’s not 
clear that the government is reaping significant return on that investment 
(which it pays for, directly or indirectly). Indeed, “it’s not about more data, 
it’s about having the right data, and having the right data takes the right 
people.” Respondents fret that, throughout the government, there is insuf-
ficient top-level understanding of how data can and should be used. To make 
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matters worse, data often exists in agency “silos” and are not frequently or 
effectively shared across government entities. Moreover, there was broad 
and shared concern about the government’s ability to keep data sufficiently 
secure from foreign adversaries. While DoD’s Cybersecurity Maturity Model 
Certification (CMMC) is a good first step, most believe it is insufficient.
° It’s difficult to think of a more important policy and practice issue than cy-
bersecurity, nor one where the solution remains a work in progress. ABA Section, 
Industry, Universities Push Back On DFARS CMMC Cybersecurity Interim Rule, 
62 GC ¶ 357 (calling for more clarity and streamlining); JCWA Concept Should 
Use Defined Interoperability Goals For Cyber Systems, 62 GC ¶ 346, discussing 
GAO-21-68, Defense Acquisitions: Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture Would 
Benefit from Defined Goals and Governance, www.gao.gov/assets/720/710760.pdf; 
DPC Issues Guidance on DFARS CMMC Cybersecurity Rule, 62 GC ¶ 349(b); 62 
GC ¶ 347(c); DFARS Interim Rule Implements CMMC Cybersecurity Model, 62 
GC ¶ 283; https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA002524-20-DPC.
pdf; Alexander Major & Franklin Turner, Feature Comment, “They’re Here:” New 
Cybersecurity Rules And Requirements Arrive To Haunt Defense Contractors, 62 
GC ¶ 287; DOD Cyber Certifying Body Begins Background Checks, Training, 62 
GC ¶ 265(c); Alex Major, Ethan Brown & Morgan Jones, Feature Comment: Be 
Sure To Drink Your Ovaltine—The DOD Cybersecurity Decoder Pin For Federal 
Encryption Standards, 62 GC ¶ 47 (“With the penalties for contractors with 
noncompliant IT systems increasing exponentially, it’s worth a lifetime’s supply 
of Ovaltine for contractors to get serious about federal encryption standards, 
find the tools necessary to meet their contractual obligations, and, of course, not 
shoot their eye out.”); A&S Issues Final Cybersecurity Model Certification, 62 GC 
¶ 38(a). See, generally, OSD(A&S) Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/cmmc/ (including a helpful FAQ’s page). 
° It’s impossible to discuss data without mentioning GAO’s report highlight-
ing its skepticism with regard to DoD’s “cost saving efforts.” GAO concluded: 
“DOD’s reported savings [in this case] of $37 billion … were not always well 
documented…. Specifically: DOD had limited information on the analysis un-
derlying its savings estimates, including (1) economic assumptions, (2) alter-
native options, and (3) any costs of taking the actions to realize savings, such 
as opportunity costs. Therefore, GAO was unable to determine the quality of 
the analysis that led to DOD’s savings decisions.” DOD’s Cost Savings Efforts 
For Key Business Operations Not Well-Documented, GAO Finds, 62 GC ¶ 326; 
GAO-21-74, Defense Reform: DOD Has Made Progress, but Needs to Further 
Refine and Formalize Its Reform Efforts, www.gao.gov/assets/720/710527.pdf. 
• Communication: The survey suggested broad interest in initiatives 
that promote greater communication – maintaining a healthy dialogue – be-
tween industry and government. There’s not much dispute that miscommuni-
cation between the government and industry inhibits successful acquisitions 
outcomes. Of course, in order to succeed, industry-government dialogue must 
be honest, open, early and frequent to keep pace with accelerated com-
munications innovation in the procurement industry. On an extremely posi-
tive and optimistic note, “83 percent of respondents said that communication 
and collaboration between government and industry improved in the last two 
years and 67 percent of respondents indicated that they believe communica-
tion and collaboration will continue to improve.”
The survey also highlighted government frustration with frivolous pro-
tests. Government officials bemoaned:
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[L]egitimate protests … should prevail; but every major acquisition 
we do now gets protested. It slows the timeline and stops progress 
in its tracks. Innovations don’t happen. We spend significant time 
[attempting …] to mitigate risks of protests. …
Protest process-defenders will point out their own successes[,] but 
don’t point out how much it freezes communication and highlights 
the wrong things. There are pilot programs to take fear away and 
better communication initiatives underway to understand why 
a win/loss decision was made. We want to ramp up and mandate 
these communication programs throughout the agency.
We take that perspective with a grain of salt. GAO’s most recent report 
confirms the long-running trend of fewer and fewer protests. The volume of 
GAO bid protests again declined in FY 2020, although the single-year decrease 
was far less significant than the dramatic drop in FY 2019. The number of 
protests filed, 2,149, is more than 20 percent fewer than the recent high of 
2,789 in FY 2016 – and, of course, a far cry from the 1993 peak of more than 
3,300 protests. See, generally, B-158766, GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to 
Congress for Fiscal Year 2020 (December 23, 2020), https://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/720/711556.pdf. Despite these data, however, many significant (and often 
high-profile) awards continue to be delayed by protests and court proceedings. 
Agency officials continue to allocate limited resources in the pursuit of mak-
ing their contract awards “protest proof.” No one in the business believes that 
protests are irrelevant, and more research would be useful. 
IV. A 2021 WISHLIST: 
Unlike the Section 809 Panel, which went BIG and, it increasingly ap-
pears, may not have received most of its wishes, we’d like to offer some modest 
requests for 2021.
A. Repeal of Executive Order (EO’s) 13950, Combating Race and 
Sex Stereotyping. All signs point to the incoming administration having 
its hands full repealing controversial, and, in many cases, toxic and harmful 
EO’s, policies, and regulations (and regulatory surrogates). This one tops of 
our list: Executive Order 13950, Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping, 85 
Fed. Reg. 60683 (September 28, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/docu-
ments/2020/09/28/2020-21534/combating-race-and-sex-stereotyping; Civil Rights, 
LGBTQ Advocacy Groups Challenge Constitutionality of Anti-diversity Training 
EO, 62 GC ¶ 320(e); OFCCP Issues RFI on EO Targeting Diversity Training as 
Businesses Urge Withdrawal, 62 GC ¶ 303(d); 85 Fed. Reg. 67375 (Oct. 22, 2020); 
OFCCP Answers FAQ on EO Targeting Diversity Training, 62 GC ¶ 296(g); Execu-
tive Order Targets Diversity Training, 62 GC ¶ 274(b). Fortunately, at least one 
federal district court already entered a nationwide preliminary injunction barring 
the EO’s enforcement. Santa Cruz Lesbian and Gay Cmty. Ctr., et al. v. Trump, 
No. 5:20-cv-07741-BLF (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020) (finding, among other things, 
with regard to grantees, “[t]he Government’s intent to restrict the free speech 
rights of federal grantees, even in circumstances where the speech in question 
has nothing to do with the purposes of the grant….”), https://www.jacksonlewis.
com/sites/default/files/docs/NDCalif_SantaCruz.pdf. Unfortunately, the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) maintains a hotline to receive 
complaints, and a clause implementing the EO’s requirements has been inserted 
into new federal contracts. See OFCCP, Executive Order 13950 - Combating Race 
and Sex Stereotyping (containing nine FAQ’s and currently acknowledging that 
“a preliminary injunction prohibit[s] OFCCP from implementing, enforcing, or 
effectuating Section 4 of [EO] 13950 ‘in any manner against any recipient of 
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federal funding by way of contract [or] subcontract….’”), https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/ofccp/faqs/executive-order-13950. Several class deviations have been 
issued to implement Section 4, including DoD Class Deviation—Combating Race 
and Sex Stereotyping (November 20, 2020), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/
policyvault/USA002235-20-DPC.pdf, and NASA Procurement Class Deviation 
20-09 (November 20, 2020), https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/procurement/regs/
pcd/pcd20-09.pdf, adding the EO language to solicitations and awards since 
November 21. Agency Inspectors General continue to report compliance with 
the EO. Any action by the new administration to reverse the EO will need also 
to address these additional contract-related elements.
B. An End to the Service Contracts Inventory? Looking ahead, we’d 
like to see policymakers correlate their efforts to engage in data-driven analyt-
ics with, well, meaningful data. One of favorite examples of a burdensome data 
requirement in search of a purpose is the Service Contracts Inventory. If, after 
nearly a decade, no one has figured out a use for the data, maybe we should stop 
collecting it. See, generally, Data Collection and Inventory for Services Contracts 
(DFARS Case 2018-D063), 85 Fed. Reg. 34569 (June 5, 2020); DPC Shifts Con-
tract Services Inventory Reporting to SAM, 62 GC ¶ 303(f); Industry, Nonprofit 
Groups Criticize DFARS Proposed Rule On Services Inventory Data, 62 GC ¶ 
234; DFARS Proposed Rule on Services Contract Inventory Reporting Require-
ments, 62 GC ¶ 169(c). Even GAO has consistently (1) questioned the accuracy 
of contract services inventories and (2) found that agencies make limited use of 
the inventories in management decision-making. DOD Still Not Using Service 
Contracts Inventory To Inform Decision-Making, 60 GC ¶ 115, GAO-18-330, DOD 
Contracted Services: Long-Standing Issues Remain about Using Inventory for 
Management Decisions, www.gao.gov/assets/700/690954.pdf, explaining that:
Military departments generally have not developed plans to use 
the inventory for workforce and budget decisions, as statutorily 
required. This is consistent with what GAO found in November 
2014 and October 2016…..
As noted previously, in November 2014 … no single office or 
individual at the military departments was responsible 
for leading or coordinating efforts between the various 
functional areas to develop a plan to use the inventory to 
inform management decisions. … As of January 2018, the Army 
and Navy still had not named accountable officials responsible for 
developing plans and enforcement mechanisms to use the inventory 
for workforce and budget decisions, according to officials at those 
departments. Navy officials said they have not reached agreement 
on the appropriate managerial level of an accountable official….
GAO Questions Accuracy Of DOD Service Contracts Inventory, 58 GC ¶ 
392; DOD Contracted Services Inventory Provides Limited Information, GAO 
Finds, 56 GC ¶ 386. And, of course, the Professional Services Council has 
urged Congress to scrap the inventories because they provide limited value 
for significant effort. Industry Recommends Revisions To Senate Defense Au-
thorization Act, 59 GC ¶ 254 (inventory “has produced limited value for the 
significant amount of effort required of contractors and related work required 
of agencies.”); 57 GC ¶ 361. See also, DOD Services Contract Inventory Suffers 
From Incomplete, Inconsistent Data, 58 GC ¶ 197, citing DODIG-2016-092, 
Independent Auditor’s Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures for DoD Compliance 
With Service Contract Inventory Compilation and Certification Requirements 
for FY 2014, www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2016-092.pdf.  
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For more than a decade, this data collection has proceeded on two flawed 
theories: (1) the number of contractor personnel should be (frankly, arbitrarily) 
reduced, and (2) the value of services contracts is based on inputs rather than 
outcomes or results. Neither theory is valid. As GAO explained:
In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced his intent to 
reduce the department’s reliance on contractors. In 2008, Congress 
required DOD to compile and review an annual inventory of the 
number of contractor employees working under service contracts 
and the functions and activities they performed. The fiscal year 
2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report 
annually on these inventories. 
GAO-11-192, Defense Acquisitions: Further Action Needed to Better Imple-
ment Requirements for Conducting Inventory of Service Contract Activities, 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-192. We welcome a discussion about 
reducing requirements, increasing the size of the military or civilian workforce, 
or rebalancing the composition of the blended workforce. But, absent those dis-
cussions, let’s stop collecting data that no one is using or, for that matter, should 
be using. Instead, let’s focus efforts on collecting data on results and outcomes. 
C. Recharging the Afghanistan (and Iraq) Visa Waiver Program 
of Special Immigration Visas. We have long bemoaned the U.S. govern-
ment’s breach of its promise to contractor personnel who supported our 
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, interpreters, without whom 
the military could not achieve its mission, have consistently been identified 
– due to their visibility working alongside military personnel – and targeted. 
Last year, only four percent of the 4,000 slots potentially available for Iraqi 
refugees who, among other things, supported American troops, were filled, 
“the lowest percentage of the four categories of refugees the administration 
authorized for resettlement….” See, generally, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Refugees 
Who Assisted the U.S. Military Find the Door to America Slammed Shut, n.Y. 
TImes (November 16, 2020) (The U.S. welcomed “[m]ore than 9,800 Iraqis … 
in 2016[, …b]y the 2019 fiscal year, that was down to 465.”), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/10/18/us/politics/trump-refugees-iraq-afghanistan.html.
D. A Clear and Simple Solution for Section 889 Compliance. Sig-
nificant energy and justifiable anxiety consumed 2020’s efforts to implement 
Section 889 of the 2019 NDAA, through which Congress imposed prohibitions 
and funding restrictions on the procurement and use of Chinese telecommu-
nications equipment and services tied to Huawei Technologies Co. or ZTE 
Corp. or their subsidiaries or affiliates. The contracting and grants community 
would benefit from, among other things, clear definitions and simple, easy to 
implement guidance, and most agree that a phased-in approach would soften 
the blow or ameliorate the compliance risks. Others seek more flexible waiver 
options and alternatives to lessen the compliance burdens and risk perceived 
by small businesses. See, e.g., Industry Groups Urge Overhaul Of Section 
889 Telecommunications Equipment Ban, 62 GC ¶ 266 (interim rule should 
be extensively revised and clarified); FAR Interim Rule Further Implements 
Telecommunications Ban, 62 GC ¶ 251(a); DOD Gets Temporary Waiver of 
Section 889 Telecommunications Ban, 62 GC ¶ 240(b); DPC Issues Guidance on 
Huawei, ZTE Telecommunications Ban, 62 GC ¶ 218(f), Implementation of the 
Section 889(a)(1)(B) Prohibition on Contracting with Entities Using Certain 
Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (July 23, 
2020) (facilitating implementation of interim FAR rule 2019-009), www.acq.
osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA001557-20-DPC.pdf; FAR Interim Final 
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Rule Implements Huawei, ZTE Contracting Ban, 62 GC ¶ 203; Amy Conant 
Hoang & David Y. Yang, Feature Comment: Don’t Overlook 889(b): The Chinese 
Telecom Prohibition’s Implications For Federal Grant Recipients, 62 GC ¶ 269 
(focusing on the restrictions placed on grant recipients); see also, 85 Fed. Reg. 
49506 (Aug. 13, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 3766 (Jan. 22, 2020); USAID, Section 889 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for Contractors and Recipients of USAID 
Awards (Sept. 18, 2020), www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Part-
ner_FAQs_09-18-2020.pdf.
E. An End to the JEDI Cloud Computing Saga? Although it has 
generated significant legal fees for protest lawyers, entertaining news for the 
community, and even a head-scratching IG report since it captured our interest 
in the Fall of 2017, we think that 2021 might see the end of the DoD’s JEDI 
cloud computing procurement-and-protest saga. Still, there was plenty of JEDI-
watching of note in 2020. DOD Reaffirms JEDI Award, 62 GC ¶ 255(b) (after 
which, on October 23, 2020, Amazon Web Services filed an amended complaint 
alleging, among other things: “Faced with President Trump’s years-long cam-
paign against awarding the JEDI Contract to AWS, the specter of retribution has 
caused DoD procurement officials to reaffirm this fundamentally flawed award 
that was demonstrably crafted to reach a pre-determined and politically accept-
able outcome.”); Fed. Cir. Rejects JEDI Procurement Protest, 62 GC ¶ 257, Oracle 
Am., Inc. v. U.S., 2020 WL 5223521 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 2020) (Among other things, 
Oracle did not meet a contract requirement, and, with regard to the conflicts of 
interest, although improper conduct occurred, it did not taint the procurement.) 
See also, Steven L. Schooner, Postscript II: Enhanced Debriefings, 34 NCRNL 
¶ 26 (“At 313 pages, and chock-full of conclusions that I expect will satisfy no 
one, [the IG Report is] an extraordinary read.”); DODIG-2020-079, Report on 
the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Procurement, https://
www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/2150471/report-on-the-joint-enterprise-
defense-infrastructure-jedi-cloud-procurement-do/; Vernon J. Edwards, The 
JEDI Acquisition: Innovation Rejected, 34 NCRNL ¶ 25 (“The JEDI acquisition 
team essentially discarded key advantages of the commercial item and single-
award task order contract acquisition innovations authorized by Congress. We 
wonder why somebody in DOD didn’t ask them: Why the heck are you doing 
those things?”) But, of course, there’s much more. Developments: DOD Awards 
JEDI Cloud Contract to Microsoft, Bypassing Amazon, Oracle, 61 GC ¶ 324(d); 
New Defense Secretary To Review JEDI Procurement, 61 GC ¶ 232; Oracle Was 
Not Prejudiced By Alleged Errors In JEDI Procurement, COFC Holds, 61 GC 
¶ 230; Oracle Am., Inc. v. U.S., 2019 WL 3385953 (Fed. Cl. July 19, 2019), but 
see, Ralph C. Nash, Hiring A Member of the Source Selection Team: Not A Rec-
ommended Practice, 33 N&CR ¶ 54 (“If you asked any knowledgeable person 
whether a company should hire a member of the Government source selection 
team in the middle of a competition, you would get a resounding NO!”); Comp. 
Gen. Denies Oracle Protest Of Single-Award Approach For JEDI Cloud IDIQ, 
61 GC ¶ 8; Oracle Am., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-416657 et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 391.
Final thoughts. Every incoming administration focuses on ways to 
improve federal acquisition and procurement. We hope this one will focus on 
getting better results – in terms of outcomes, such as customer satisfaction 
and value for money – from procurement. We look forward to letting you know 
how they’ve done at this time next year.
